"Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions - Ten Years Later."
Thomas L. Martin, Jr.
President, Illinois Institute of Technology

The official birthday of the Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions is July 23, 1976. In a memorandum to the academic deans on that day, I wrote as follows:

"The reason for the establishment of this Center derives from several strongly held convictions regarding IIT's unique position within the educational spectrum. First, IIT is to be an institution that aims primarily at the preparation of its students for careers in certain professions. Second, it is assumed that the characteristic which distinguishes a professional from a technician is the ability of the professional to bring considerations of professional ethics into the application of his technical skills in the solution of problems. In contrast, the technician is concerned only with the application of the technical skills. As a consequence, if IIT is to be sincere in its commitment to professional education, then it must necessarily require that all of its educational programs take the matter of professional ethics into serious account.

Nearly all of the major professional areas, the military, engineering, architecture, medicine, law, journalism, psychology, and others as well, have some published professional code of ethics. In the current post-Watergate period, a period in which improprieties in government, in business and in all areas of our society have become increasingly evident, the importance of attention to professional ethics has never been more urgent or more apparent. In establishing a Center for the Study of Professional Ethics, and in requiring all of its students to participate to one extent or another in the examination and study of professional ethics appropriate to their particular field, IIT will be unique among the educational institutions in the United States.

The implementation of this program raises a number of very important collateral issues. Important among these is the matter of assisting the student in the development of his personal value system. It is self evident that such a personal value system should be compatible with the professional ethics of the student's anticipated career path. This suggests that IIT has further important responsibilities in the area of career guidance and selection, and in assisting students in arriving at suitable value systems. It also suggests that faculty members themselves should serve as exemplars of professional ethics, providing worthy role models for the students to emulate."

Overall and from the perspective of 10 years later, I believe the Center has successfully achieved these ambitious expectations. But I confess to some disappointment that curriculum planning at IIT has not embraced the study of ethics in the professions as comprehensively or intensively as originally hoped. For example, the 1976 memorandum stated:

"It is further expected that anew requirement for completion of the Master of Engineering degree will be introduced which will stipulate that every student should have a minimum of three semester credit hours in courses in professional ethics. Looking to the future, as further financial support becomes available, it is anticipated that additional courses in ethics for each of the other professional areas will be developed and will also be made mandatory for the various professional master's degrees, as well as for the juris Doctor degree. In the long haul, perhaps three to five years from now, it is expected that there will be required courses for all undergraduate students in the professional ethics of their individual fields."

While not all of these objectives
have been reached in its first decade, the progress of the Center has been outstanding and these hopes will surely be achieved in the coming decade.

Over the past 10 years the Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions has become an integral part of the academic and research programs of the Illinois Institute of Technology. Its importance and impact will both accelerate in the second decade of its existence.

"Applied Philosophy, Autonomy and Professional Ethics"
Terrell Ward Bynum, The Metaphilosophy Foundation, Hyde Park, NY

1. The Issue
Nearly two decades ago, in his ground-breaking article "Applied Philosophy" (written in 1969), Leslie Stevenson urged philosophers to apply their philosophical knowledge and skills to issues like abortion, sexual morality, world hunger, the definition of death, and so on. He envisioned the development of a new discipline, "applied philosophy," analogous to the field of "applied mathematics." Just as there is an academic subject of applied mathematics, not very clearly distinct from pure mathematics on one side and not sharply defined from industrial and commercial applications on the other; so why should their not be a somewhat loosely defined discipline of applied philosophy, with a fuzzy borderline with pure philosophy on one side, and branching out into multifarious everyday problems on the other? (Stevenson 1970, p. 261)

Stevenson noted at the time that skeptics would doubt that an autonomous field of knowledge exists between pure philosophy and important everyday questions. He argued, however, that it really is unimportant whether applied philosophy is an autonomous discipline.

There are important questions which urgently need the best investigations we can give them, and philosophical expertise can help that investigation. What label is given the investigation is a much less important question. (p. 261)

He recommended that there be courses, study groups, panels, commissions, research institutes, and publications on applied philosophy; but he noted, there will be the usual academic scorn for "popularizing" and "journalism" (in the perjorative sense). I think we should not be afraid of this. The issues are, as I've said, too important to be left to the journalists. The correct reply to the taunt of "journalism" is that of "social responsibility." (p. 266)

Stevenson was correct that critics would say applied philosophy is not a field in its own right-and not "real philosophy"-but he had his finger upon the philosophical pulse of the day. His recommendations, it turned out, corresponded exactly with a trend or "movement" that was just beginning in philosophy; for in the seventeen years since his paper was written, scores of conferences and symposia have been held on applied philosophy; hundreds of colleges and universities have added courses; journals have been established, such as Philosophy and Public Affairs, Applied Philosophy, Environmental Ethics, Business and Professional Ethics; research centers have been established, like the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy (University of Maryland), and the Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions (Illinois Institute of Technology). Applied philosophy has become a significant part of the profession. (Indeed, the October 1986 issue of the American Philosophical Association's Jobs for Philosophers lists 53 jobs that involve the teaching of applied philosophy-more than 25% of the 208 jobs listed!)

In spite of applied philosophy's current success, one still occasionally hears the taunt that it is not "real philosophy," or that branches of professional ethics, such as medical ethics, are "not autonomous disciplines." What should one make of such criticisms? Do they point to something significant about professional ethics or other areas of applied philosophy? Are they mere expressions of ignorance or fear of the new and different? Let us address these questions here to see if we can learn something of value about professional ethics. We can start by discussing medical ethics in particular.

2. Medical Ethics
In his article "There Is No ACME in Ethical Consulting" (1986), Paul Sharkey criticizes the growing practice of using medical ethics "consultants" to advise doctors in ethically difficult cases:

There is no such thing as a "board
"Medical Ethicists (ACME)"—nor should there be. If being ethical means anything at all, it means being responsible. There cannot be "ethics specialists" because being responsible is not a speciality. (p. 6)

Thus, according to Sharkey, one cannot make a doctor virtuous by giving him or her advice, or making tough decisions in place of the doctor, or teaching a course in medical ethics. However, it is even more absurd to believe that keeping people ignorant of basic principles of value, moral responsibility and ethical problem solving skills will contribute to their becoming ethically responsible. Assuming even a minimal predisposition to doing what is right, value education can only increase the probability of doing so. To argue otherwise is to argue that ignorance is better than knowledge. (p. 7)

Sharkey suggests that the best way to obtain virtuous doctors is to staff medical schools with doctors who practice medicine virtuously and thereby serve as appropriate rolemodels. And the proper role for a "Medical ethicist" is not as a consultant called in to tell a doctor what to do, but rather as part of a clinical team in a teaching hospital:

the ethicist . . . can help residents and faculty identify and work out ethical issues which they in turn can model for their students as part of an ethically and technologically integrated practice. Only by experiencing the responsibilities of being a resident or other independent practitioner are the ethicist's professional services likely to be appreciated. (p. 8)

But what if medical ethics is not even an autonomous field with its own data and principles? How could a so-called "medical ethicist" claim to have a kind of knowledge that others don't have? This question, according to Bernard Baumrin in his important article "The Autonomy of Medical Ethics" (1985), is a "fundamental" one for medical ethics:

I say 'fundamental' because in the absence of an answer to this question, a critic might justifiably argue that every apparent question in medical ethics is really only a question of good science, or the low, or religion, or just plain ethics, and if that were so, then medical ethics could be justly dismissed as just so much vacuous gab better handled by the physicists, lawyers, theologians, ethicists, hospital administrators, friends, family members or journalists than by anyone professing to have special knowledge about a special subject... if there is no special or autonomous discipline (no fundamental data) then the critic who claims the professor has no subject is right. (pp. 94-5)

According to Baumrin, a discipline is not "autonomous" if its technical terms are all definable in the language of another discipline and its fundamental principles are all derivable from another domain. He notes, for example, that metallurgy is reducible to chemistry, and chemistry itself is reducible to physics, so metallurgy and chemistry are not "autonomous" domains.

But if this account of autonomy is correct, Barnum's above point about medical ethics is a bit overstated. Even if chemistry and metallurgy are not autonomous, it would be incorrect to say that a metallurgy professor or a chemistry professor "has no subject," or that the lectures of such a professor are "just so much vacuous gab" better handled by a physicist. Similarly, medical ethics would be a useful and defensible enterprise, even if it were ultimately reducible to some other domain.

Baumrin's main point, however, is a much more important one, for it provides insight into the nature of medical ethics and, ultimately, other branches of professional ethics. His major claim is that medical ethics makes use of sui generis data and fundamental precepts that are not derivable from any other discipline. There are, he says "three interrelated precepts of medical science," which "form the bedrock of the morality of medical science." (p. 93) These "bedrock" principles are,

(1) healing through knowledge,  (2) ignorance justifies research,  (3) knowledge guides treatment.

These principles, according to Baumrin, derive from the fundamental value of medical science —health—and the Hippocratic commitment to knowledge as a means to healing:

No man of medicine, at least from Greek times, has been unaware of the fact that the 'health' that medicine aims at is a good ranked very high by all or most people, and the job of medicine is to produce that good and no other in the form of prevention and healing. The whole idea behind the Hippocratic revolution in medicine is 'healing through
knowledge.‘ (p. 95)

The aim of medical science, then, is the acquisition of knowledge for the sake of healing; and the aim of medical practice is to heal by means of such knowledge. Baumrin sets out a case in his article in which these two goals of medicine conflict—a case in which medical science's pursuit of knowledge for healing conflicts with medical practice's duty to heal the patient in the most promising manner. In such a case, there is a fundamental conflict between knowledge acquisition and knowledge application, and the study of that conflict and its resolution is a subject of medical ethics and no other discipline. It is this fact, even if there were no others, that establishes the autonomy of medical ethics, for it provides a species of data not reducible to the subject matter of other branches of study, and these data are addressed by principles specific to medical practice, imbedded deep in what the object of the medical arts is. (p. 101)

Baumrin's key point, then, is that medical ethics is more than the application of general moral concepts and principles to medical practice. It involves values and principles specific to medicine, and not derivable from any other field. Of course, it also deals, he says, with applications of regular moral principles—for example, truth-telling to patients and family members, or social justice in the allocation of scarce medical resources and the right to medical care. A proper understanding of the field of medical ethics, then, requires both general moral theories and values and precepts unique to medicine.

Is this combination of "borrowed" and "domain specific" values and principles unique to medical ethics? Do all branches of professional ethics have such a two-fold combination of moral elements? In a footnote at the end of his article, Baumrin claims that similar analysis could be given of other branches of applied ethics and thereby establish "the autonomy of applied ethics as a general branch of philosophic study." (p. 102) If this is correct, one should be able to identify, for each branch of professional ethics, one or more key values and related precepts not associated with other disciplines nor with general moral theory. In addition, of course, one would expect to find some issues in each branch that involve "merely" applications of regular moral rules and concepts.

3. Other Branches of Professional Ethics

It is not at all difficult to find issues in any profession that involve the application of general (i.e., non profession-specific) moral rules and values, such as truth-telling, respect for privacy, and so on: In business, one should not cheat one's customers nor file fraudulent income tax returns; an engineer should not mislead a client about his or her ability to design a structure or machine; a computer scientist should not invade nor alter the private computer files of others; and so on. Just like moral questions in everyday life, many such "professional" issues are easily resolved without sophisticated analysis, while others are "sticky" and troublesome. Given the abovementioned point that knowledge is better than ignorance, a business person, lawyer, engineer, computer scientist, and so on, should be able to handle the difficult cases more effectively given a background in "ordinary" moral analysis and moral reasoning especially if this included practice in dealing with a variety of typical cases from the profession in question. This fact alone would justify courses, speeches, and publications in professional ethics, even if they were to employ only general moral theories.

But is Baumrin correct that each profession also has its own fundamental good (like health in medicine) and some resulting "bedrock moral precepts" that are not shared by other professions? It does seem to be almost "common sense" that each profession provides some service, and thus promotes some good that people need or want. As Powers and Vogel (1980) note:

physicians heal, ministers serve, nurses nourish, educators "lead out" .... The starting point for most applied professional ethics is inevitably the normative purpose of the profession. It is the professional purpose that provides the filter through which principles are strained. As circumstances of professional practice change, the specific responsibilities of the practitioner change. Some principles take on new meaning or importance; some must recede. But the purpose of a profession does not change .... (Powers and Vogel 1980, p. 3)

According to Powers and Vogel, a business manager should promote the successful functioning of the firm in which he or she works, which in turn promotes the service or good which the firm provides to society.

Michael Bayles, in his book
Professional Ethics (1981), also appears to assume that each profession has its own special good. Thus, he says, "the services of professionals are important for individuals to realize the values they seek in their personal lives—health, wealth, justice, comfort, and safety." (p. 10) So,

Consulting engineers and architects design the structures and facilities essential to modern life-buildings, houses, power stations, transportation systems, and so on. Most of us depend on the medical and dental professions to protect our health and well-being, even our lives. The legal profession provides services essential for justice and equality before the law. Accountants, as auditors, testify to the financial integrity of institutions and keep track of the wealth in society. (P 10)

Such examples of profession specific values and "normative purposes of professions" are consistent with Baumrin's analysis. But what about the "bedrock precepts" that he says follow from the profession specific values? Are there any such moral principles in other professions, comparable to "healing through knowledge" or "knowledge guides treatment" in medicine? I think the best approach to answering this important question is to use the "role morality" analysis employed by Norman Bowie in his book Business Ethics (1982). Bowie traces this kind of ethical analysis back to F. H. Bradley (see, for example, Bradley's essay "My Station and its Duties" (1876)).

Role morality takes note of the fact that having a role within any cooperative human endeavor—whether it be in a family, a club, a company, society in general, or whatever—bring with it certain duties and obligations. Regarding parenthood, for example, Bowie notes:

Being a parent brings with it obligations and responsibilities. One's stewardship as a parent can be judged against one's performance in carrying out one's obligations and responsibilities. Some parents are better than others. The extensive and willful neglect of one's parental responsibilities is universally branded as immoral. Being a parent involves having a certain station in life, and with that station certain duties are associated. (Bowie 1982, pp. 4-5)

Similarly, says Bowie, the same point holds with regard to one's job; and, "The more professional a job, the greater the responsibilities that go with it" (p. 6) Professionals who help people achieve or preserve important values like health, justice, knowledge, and so on have especially stringent role-related obligations.

Since his book concerns business ethics, Bowie goes on to discuss the role-related morality of business. He then offers arguments (Kantian in nature) to show that certain "universal moral obligations"—namely, those regarding justice and individual rights—"supersede role morality in all its forms." Similar arguments can be given for other professions besides business; and, if one accepts the Kantian approach, they are strong ones. (However, there is no space here to rehearse them.)

4. Conclusions
Using Bowie's "role morality" approach, we are now in a position to assess Baumrin's claims about "bedrock precepts," and also to draw some conclusions about the usefulness of professional ethics. When one assumes the role of a professional, he or she takes on certain rolespecific duties—in general, those which advance and preserve the special good(s) at which the profession in question aims. The resulting profession-specific duties impose obligations upon the professional that do not normally apply to everyone else (a doctor has the obligation to heal through knowledge, a lawyer to advance legal justice, a teacher to promote knowledge and remove ignorance, and so on). These "bedrock precepts" of the professions get refined and articulated into a variety of more specific obligations, which depend upon the particular conditions and circumstances of those involved.

Although such profession-specific obligations usually are consistent with general moral values and principles, sometimes they clash. When this happens, the professional precepts must give way to general morality. Thus a doctor may not steal or cheat on his or her taxes even to advance the health of a patient, and a lawyer may not murder someone even to gain legal justice for a client.

Sometimes cases arise (as Baumrin notes) in which two or more professional precepts within the same discipline conflict with each other. In such a situation, general moral theory will be of no use to the professional because the obligations are specific to the profession in question and not incumbent upon everyone. In that kind of case, the special knowledge of professional
ethics rather than general moral knowledge can be of particular help. In summary, then, if we combine the obvious point that "knowledge is better than ignorance" with Baumrin's demonstration that professional ethics is in an important sense "autonomous," it is clear that courses, conferences, training programs and publications in professional ethics can provide valuable tools to the world's professionals and thereby help to contribute to a better world.

References


"What Happened During Our First Ten Years"

Fay Horton Sawyier, Editor, CSEP, Illinois Institute of Technology

The Watergate disclosures and other scandals of the early 1970s were startling examples of the immorality of conduct and decision-making by persons in high and responsible places. Decent men and women reacted with dismay, anger, and, in some cases, with a determination to try to change things. For example, when Thomas Martin, then President of Illinois Institute of Technology, received news of a gift of half a million dollars to his University, he seized the opportunity to make a real contribution to professional morality and responsibility. President Martin sought out the small group of professional philosophers at LIT to inquire whether we were interested in developing a program of research and teaching in professional ethics. That was how the Ethics Center was born.

During the infancy of the Ethics Center, when these philosophers were trying, in effect, to retool and to learn how to apply moral philosophy to concrete situations, we met for several hours every week. Early on it was determined that field work—that is, that interviews and research and investigation and reading about the actual problems and issues facing engineers—was going to be absolutely essential. No "armchair philosopher" was ever part of the Center's team!

Far and away the most useful and inspiring contact any of us had in the days of our early travail was with Professor Eben Vey of the Department of Civil Engineering. Eben Vey was deeply troubled by the emerging evidence of serious misconduct by engineers, and he resolved to dedicate whatever strength remained to him to helping our fledgling Center become established and rightly oriented. His death from cancer the next year was a great loss to his profession and to the citizenry as well as to us. He attended every one of our meetings during the three or four months when we were first learning how to explore this new field. His presence and character then and the memory of them now give us an intuition of what the ideal standard of professional responsibility should be.

Subsequent to the novelty, intensity and inspiration of those earliest days, a great deal has been accomplished. The first Center Director was Ernest d'Anjou (1976-79). During his years we prepared the first "Moral Issues in Engineering" course and with no known precedent. One exceedingly tough-minded student wrote later to two of us: "I thought the whole idea of such a course was dumb and I didn't really enjoy it that much, but man have I ever found that I use the things you taught me, now that I'm out and working! Thanks." At that time too, Robert Ladenson led the preparation and publication of the first annotated bibliography in Engineering Ethics. Various members of the Center group were regularly invited to attend and address meetings, to serve as consultants, to give public lectures, and to organize workshops and conferences. A Conference on Engineering Ethics, funded by N.S.F was conducted at LIT Engineers and philosophers from around the country worked...
together on cases and on formulating morally acceptable solutions to concrete and troublesome situations during two weeks in the summer of 1979. From the beginning, the main responsibility for this Conference, for subsequent conferences in this field and for important publications resulting from them was assumed by Vivian Weil, who of course always made appropriate use of the other long-time Center members as well.

During those first years, two other "Moral Issues" courses were developed and began to be taught regularly, one in Business and one in Architecture and City Planning. Originally every Center Course was co-taught by a philosopher and a professional engineer or Business School professor or architect. Every Center course emphasizes the concrete, on-the-job aspects of moral problems and the instructors try to keep up-to-date on newly emerging practical situations within these and other professions.

Dr. Mark Frankel became Center Director in 1979. During the Frankel years a tremendous number of new and exciting enterprises were initiated and all earlier projects were continued and expanded. These accomplishments are especially impressive in view of the fact that both our internal and external funding had diminished! Yet somehow grants were obtained for projects in engineering ethics, for workshops and meetings related to architectural ethics, for investigations about the concept of "owning" intellectual products such as software, for consideration of the restrictions on freedom of information in science, for "modules" in applied ethics, and so on.

A Center Library was established during this period and we collected an impressive and growing collection of relevant books, periodicals and articles. The Center hosted a series of luncheons, each of which focused on a particular area of moral concern to a more general population. These working luncheons turned out to be very successful and made many new friends for the Center, as well as teaching those of us who work here more about "real world" moral issues. A new "Moral Issues" course was developed by John Snapper dealing with problems associated with the computer industry and technology. The list of invited addresses and publications by Center members has grown tremendously and our working knowledge of how to teach an effective course in professional ethics for precisely targeted professions has so deepened that we are regularly consulted by other Universities and Centers on how to do this. Finally, during the Frankel years we began to publish a regular periodical called PERSPECTIVES ON THE PROFESSIONS.

In the summer of 1986 Dr. Frankel resigned to take the position of Program Head of the Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility of the A.A.A.S. The interim Director, Dr. Vivian Weil, is a nationally prominent and widely respected figure in the field of professional ethics. Her depth of concern, information and judgment in this field is equaled by few if any persons in the country. And for this year, at least, we have also the superb talents and industry of Dr. Michael Davis, a philosopher with an impressive record of publications on legal ethics.

As we start our second decade, therefore, we feel confident about our continued and growing ability to contribute to the goal set for us so long ago by Eben Vey. That goal is to help to promote professional responsibility and to uncover the range of conditions that diminish it. Effective progress toward this objective requires the kind of reflective and analytic examination of contexts, conditions and issues which, over the years, members of the Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions have learned how to offer.
ethics was very much "in" among foundations, the federal government, and other potential benefactors to whom the Center looked for support. IIT could be, and was, quite generous. The Center had few competitors.

All that has changed. Ethics, though not exactly "out," is no longer "in" among foundations, the federal government, or other benefactors. Ethics has simply become one area of funding among many, one among many competing for less money than was available ten years ago. Many of the foundations on which the Center relied in the past for large grants are funded by corporations which, like Exxon, have suffered from the recent hard times. Meanwhile, the federal government seems to be ever less willing to support any nonlethal activity. And, of course, while you could have counted ethics centers on the fingers of one hand ten years ago, you could not count them today without the fingers and toes of four or five other people.

Why then am I willing to predict that the Center will survive ten more years? My answer is that the Center has resources few other ethics centers can match. Among these are its connection with IIT, its location in Chicago, and its history. Each of these resources deserves some explaining. Let me take them in order.

The Center's connection with IIT is a resource in part because of what IIT gets from the Center. IIT is a university, but bears the name of a famous technical school. It is also a good small university but is within easy commuting distance of many good schools, both public and private, including two of the world's great universities. Apart from moving to Ohio or Tennessee, about all IIT can do to get people to pay attention to it, to attract students, faculty, and philanthropy, is to have programs that differ from those of other Chicago institutions in a way people generally approve.

The Center's connection with IIT is also a resource because of what the Center gets from IIT. Apart from money, what the Center gets from IIT is close association with an institution large enough to have schools of engineering, architecture, business, and law, as well as an undergraduate program in philosophy, but not so large that the faculty of those schools are cut off from one another and from us. The Center is not only able to draw on faculty members of these professional schools for advice, collaboration, and criticism, but also able to try out experimental courses, new materials, and the like with their students. The Center would be a far less appropriate place for the study of ethics in the professions if IIT were less a collection of professional schools and more a traditional liberal arts college.

That brings me to the second and third resources standing surity for the Center's existence ten years from now, Chicago and the Center's own history. The Center is a livelier place for being in Chicago. The same universities that compete with IIT for students and money provide the Center with an enormous pool of possible associates. We are a dollar or two away from people many other centers must fly in to see. We are able to form long-term working groups which, but for the proximity of the participants, would be impractical. Chicago is itself a great university of which its many universities, seminaries, hospitals, museums, and other institutions are part. So, for example, while "at the Center;" I attend a workshop on Ethics and Public Policy at the University of Chicago, go downtown for meetings of a group studying corruption, attend a conference on business ethics at Loyola, and discuss the ethics of audit failure with some members of my wife's law firm. What would the Center be like if it were located in a college town?

The Center's history is, I think, in large part a product of its location in Chicago. The Center has been able to attract good people; some in part because they were already in Chicago; others, because Chicago was much more lively than where they were. Attracting good people is, of course, part of what has helped the Center develop a reputation for doing what it does well. But attracting good people is not enough to explain why the Center has so often been first, or tied first, in identifying ethical problems in this or that profession, helping members of the profession sort out the issues, and producing analytical articles, bibliographies, and teaching materials on the subject. Attracting good people is not enough to explain why the Center has so often been first, or tied first, in identifying ethical problems in this or that profession, helping members of the profession sort out the issues, and producing analytical articles, bibliographies, and teaching materials on the subject. Attracting good people is not enough to explain why the Center has so often been first, or tied first, in identifying ethical problems in this or that profession, helping members of the profession sort out the issues, and producing analytical articles, bibliographies, and teaching materials on the subject. Attracting good people is not enough to explain why the Center has so often been first, or tied first, in identifying ethical problems in this or that profession, helping members of the profession sort out the issues, and producing analytical articles, bibliographies, and teaching materials on the subject. Attracting good people is not enough to explain why the Center has so often been first, or tied first, in identifying ethical problems in this or that profession, helping members of the profession sort out the issues, and producing analytical articles, bibliographies, and teaching materials on the subject.
The Center's history of being first is an important resource. It gives us a claim on potential benefactors that few other ethics centers can match. Of course, like many resources, this one will decay if not regularly replenished. An important part of the reason I am willing to predict that the Center will be here ten years from now, is that I believe the Center will continue to develop new ideas in a way most centers cannot match. In this respect at least, my first prediction is premised on my SECOND, THAT, BY 1996, THE CENTER'S STAFF WILL BE DOUBLE ITS PRESENT LEVEL.

IIT wants the Center to bring in substantially more money than it is now doing. For reasons already given, the Center is not likely to be able to do that simply by getting more grants. Neither business nor government is likely to increase substantially the amount of money available for study of professions. The only alternative source of substantial income for the Center seems to be fees for providing programs of continuing professional education in ethics. The Center is already at work on a prototype of such programs. I am willing to predict the appointment by 1988 of some one who could take the primary responsibility for developing continuing education programs, because the appointment is a good investment in the future of the Center. My prediction for 1996 is simply a function of the hope that the continuing education programs and grants together will produce enough income to support additional research associates and supporting staff.

That brings me to my THIRD, LAST, AND MOST DARING PREDICTION. By 1996, the Center will be conducting research on such diverse subjects as changing notions of ownership in science and technology, professional self-regulation, the coordination of technical knowledge and managerial decision, the moral responsibility of architects for culture, history, and appearance of Chicago's neighborhoods, the effect of student grievance procedures on academic freedom, the ethics of waste disposal, and morally permissible strategies in labor-management negotiation.

The Center will also have an endowed program for visiting fellows. These would be practitioners chosen among competing applicants. They would take off from one week to one month from corporate duties, work in a professional association, or other nonacademic activity to take up residence at the Center during the school year. They would have no duties, but would be expected to read, think, and talk about ethics with Center staff. Many would accept an invitation or two to provide; a class with the insights of an ethically sensitive practitioner. Former fellows would be invited to serve on research projects of interest to them.

Meanwhile, the Center's continuing education division would be offering a wide range of courses in applied ethics at each of IIT's three campuses and at many corporate training centers all over the midwest . . . .

Here I must stop. My guessing has already turned into hopes and bright dreams.

Will any of this last prediction come true? Who knows? But I do not apologize for it. Unlike Cassandra's prophesy, mine is neither terrifying nor made useless by its certainty. It is a prospectus rather than a doom. Only a little money, luck, and work stands between us and an achievement as welcome to IIT, Chicago and, indeed, all people of good will, as to the Center itself.

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"The Future of CSEP"

Vivian Weil, CSEP, Illinois Institute of Technology

When I try to look ahead, I always go back to the Center's beginning, especially to our feelings of excitement and exhilaration at moving into uncharted areas. It was also scary to depart from problems and approaches certified by our teachers and training and to head off on our own. That was part of the excitement. We philosophers began by doing empirical work for the first time in our professional lives. Meeting with members of our engineering faculty, particularly one of the civil engineers, and consulting with practitioners, we learned about ethical problems in engineering. But we had anchored ourselves safely in a familiar task. We were preparing to teach a course—this time an innovative course on moral issues in engineering.

One of the great pleasures of the first decade was somehow finding ways to pursue the problems wherever they led us. When we became aware of problems of secrecy and confidentiality for engineers we were led to investigate intellectual property
practices. We then turned to look at restrictions on the dissemination of scientific and technical information from the broad perspective of first amendment protection of free expression. Interest in openness and secrecy in communication of research findings drew our attention to the current proliferation of university-industry research relationships in biotechnology. We hope to investigate the impact of those arrangements on the traditional value of openness in the university. And I look forward to continuing to find the means to pursue lines of investigation where they lead.

I anticipate that we will find more opportunities to work with practitioners, through teaching in nonacademic settings, collaborating on projects with professional societies, and through bringing selected practitioners to the center as participants in a program of fellowships. In our first decade we sought and found opportunities for exchanges with practitioners. However, we had too much to learn about collaborating with other academic disciplines to be able to give as much energy to projects with practitioners as now we plan to do.

My guess is that we will have increasing contact with practitioners not only because we are more inclined and better prepared for it but also because practitioners themselves are more receptive. One reason is that the public remains firm in its demands for accountability. Another is that the structures of practice in the major professions are changing. For example, company supported health plans increasingly set the terms under which physicians practice. The resulting constraints alter the duties and privileges which define the physician's role. A third reason is that technological development continues to introduce new choices and present ethical problems which, if now wholly new, at least appear in new guises.

I look forward to the Center's growth in two main areas of activity: in carrying out funded research projects and in teaching and consulting in companies and other nonacademic settings. Both kinds of effort will be necessary for supporting the Center and for advancing understanding in applied ethics. It is difficult to say what balance should be and harder still to bring it about, but it is important not to forego the rewards of either kind of effort.

Reflecting about the subject matter with which we are concerned, I am struck by the usefulness of Plato's way of putting a key question that arises for all the professions. He observed that an occupation is based on a body of knowledge and a set of skills. Practitioners employ that knowledge and those skills according to a set of standards appropriate to that knowledge and those skills. They also earn their living from using the knowledge and skills and so they occupy a position in the marketplace, which has its appropriate standards. How do we relate the one set of standards to the other?

"Announcements"

CONFERENCES: There will be a symposium entitled "Assessing Corporate Academic Ties in Biotechnology" at the meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science on February 15, 1987, in Chicago. Topics will include academic freedom, conflict of interest, and the changing role of the university. For further information, please write the symposium organizers, Vivian Weil and Paul DeForest, at the Center.

CRAWFORD LECTURES: To celebrate our tenth anniversary, the Crawford Foundation is sponsoring a series of three public lectures at the Center. The first speaker was Leon Lederman, the Director of Fermilab, whose title was: "Science: The Promise and the Threat." It took place on Thursday, November 20, 1986. Two lectures will take place on February 26, 1986. The first will be by Carl Cohen, of the Philosophy Department and Medical School of the University of Michigan, who will be speaking on "Doctors and Lawyers." William Thomas, an attorney and scientist with the American Bar Foundation, will present the second talk, with the title "Engineers, Scientists, and Lawyers." For more information, please contact this Center.

CENTER PUBLICATIONS: Our Module Series in Applied Ethics can now be ordered directly from us. Please address orders to: MODULES, c/o Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions; Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, IL 60616. Titles currently available include:

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**NOTICE:** *Science, Technology, and Human Values* will publish, in the January, 1987 issue, six papers emanating from the CSEP 1985 NSF-EVIST supported conference on Ethical Implications of Intellectual Property for Science and Technology.  

**FELLOWSHIPS:** The Institute for the Study of Applied and Professional Ethics at Dartmouth College invites applications for two Fellows in Residence for 1987-1988. Applications must be received by January 15, 1987. For further information and application forms, please write: Dr. Charles M. Culver; The Ethics Institute; Dartmouth College; Hanover, NH 03755.  

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