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Vol. 7, No. 2, January 1988
"Ethics in Government Legislation, New York State, 1987"
Sarah A. Merrill, Ph.D., Kansas State University With Heidi Jane Siegfried, M.S.W, J.D.

Two pieces of ethics legislation were signed into law in New York State in 1987. As the Governor says, one tells us "what the public officials are doing with their own money" (The Ethics Law) and the other tells us "what public officials are doing with our money" (The Public Audits Law). The second is probably the more significant legislation, and the one that has had relatively little public attention paid it. It requires regular auditing, by outside auditors, of all major agencies and the legislature every two years.

Our focus here, however, is the so called "Ethics Law." The original ethics bill, which the Governor vetoed, passed just before Easter break. It was more than seventy pages long, and full of weaknesses. When individual New York Slate legislators were lobbied over Easter vacation on behalf of changes the Governor proposed, most would not reply "until my leader comes back from recess." Because of this short-circuiting of public activism, the outrage over the ethics in government issue was mere press outrage. The final bill was in consequence much weaker than many had hoped. We will now review the bill pointing out major weaknesses.

The Ethics Law provides for full public disclosure of the personal finances of legislators and key state employees. This is now the strongest feature of the new law.

Weaknesses: The legislation requires that any employee with income of more than $30,000 a year file a public disclosure form. Even many of those who make more than $30,000 a year have little political influence, and a significant portion of those making less are in important policy-making positions or deal with confidential matters about which conflicts of interest could easily arise. So a better test of what constitutes a "key" political position is needed.

Another weakness of the disclosure provision is that the information to be disclosed includes much not relevant to political corruption. For example, alimony payments of a state worker or legislator are not something about which the public needs to know. State workers and the thousands of others now required to report will be able to apply for exemptions from making such information public. But granting exemptions will require an ample bureaucracy vulnerable to the usual inertia, difficulties in updating and expunging data, and computer assisted error.

The Ethics Law forbids legislators and their staffs to have any conflict of interest and forbids executive staff to lobby state government for several years after leaving office.

Weakness: Executive staff had never been permitted to come back to lobby on an issue on which they had legislative or policy input. While the new law strengthens this prohibition, it does not extend it to the legislative branch. A member of the legislative staff can resign in December and lobby during the very next session in January, advising people on policies and strategies in the session he or she had just helped to plan.

The Ethics Law prohibits legislators, party officers, or their partners from practicing law before state tribunals and agencies.

Legislators and party officers have to show that they do not benefit from that portion of income their law firm receives for cases their partners bring before government agencies, tribunals, and regulatory bodies. Law firms with which public officials are associated must submit categorized lists of their clients.

Weakness: The legislation does not bar profits coming to the firm, and so to the legislator, because he is a partner in the firm. Lobbyist still have an incentive to give business to a legislator's firm as a way of getting on the legislator's good side.

The Ethics Law bars state part officials from simultaneously holding a state job. Weaknesses: While state party officials are thus barred, local party leaders, are not. Yet, in most of the recent corruption scandals, it was the local (county or borough) official or party leader who was corrupted. For example, in the Biaggi scandal which reached into the U.S. Congress, Brooklyn party official Expositowas in the hot seat.

The Ethics Law gives the Ethics Commission considerable independence. The compromise bill held up the session several weeks while haggling continued over whether the Governor or the Legislature would appoint Ethics Commission members. In the end, each branchexecutive, legislative, and judicial was given independent powers of appointment.

Once this legislation takes effect in 1989, the power to punish those who have been corrupted in the specific new areas covered by the law, rests not with the prosecutors, but with the Executive Ethics Commission. The twenty-one Commission members, nine members of the review boards (for hearing appeals), and the exemption-granting committee members will deal with and sometimes represent the three branches of government. At least three members of the legislative commission are specifically selected for the reason that they are (and were) not legislators, and do not represent legislators; they are to "have no ties to the legislature."

Weaknesses: A district attorney will have no power to do his traditional job with regard to the new ethics requirements and prohibitions unless expressly asked to do so in a particular case by the legislatively appointed commission. Failure to file financial disclosure statements or false disclosure must, further, be shown to have been not only willful but also done with intent to deceive. This situation, according to journalist Alan Chartock, constitutes a situation in which "the fox is left to guard the henhouse."

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