1. The Issue
Nearly two decades ago, in his ground-breaking article "Applied Philosophy" (written in 1969), Leslie Stevenson urged philosophers to apply their philosophical knowledge and skills to issues like abortion, sexual morality, world hunger, the definition of death, and so on. He envisioned the development of a new discipline, "applied philosphy," analogous to the field of "applied mathematics." Just as there is

an academic subject of applied mathematics, not very clearly distinct from pure mathematics on one side and not sharply defined from industrial and commercial applications on the other; so why should their not be a somewhat loosely defined discipline of applied philosophy, with a fuzzy borderline with pure philosophy on one side, and branching out into multifarious everyday problems on the other? (Stevenson 1970, p. 261)

Stevenson noted at the time that skeptics would doubt that an autonomous field of knowledge exists between pure philosophy and important everyday questions. He argued, however, that it really is unimportant whether applied philosophy is an autonomous discipline.

There are important questions which urgently need the best investigations we can give them, and philosophical expertise can help that investigation. What label is given the investigation is a much less important question. (p. 261)

He recommended that there be courses, study groups, panels, commissions, research institutes, and publications on applied philosophy; but he noted,

there will be the usual academic scorn for "popularizing" and "journalism" (in the perjorative sense). I think we should not be afraid of this. The issues are, as I've said, too important to be left to the journalists. The correct reply to the taunt of "journalism" is that of "social responsibility." (p. 266)

Stevenson was correct that critics would say applied philosophy is not a field in its own right-and not "real philosophy"-but he had his finger upon the philosophical pulse of the day. His recommendations, it turned out, corresponded exactly with a trend or "movement" that was just beginning in philosophy; for in the seventeen years since his paper was written, scores of conferences and symposia have been held on applied philosophy; hundreds of colleges and universities have added courses; journals have been established, such as Philosophy and Public Affairs, Applied Philosophy, Environmental Ethics, Business and Professional Ethics; research centers have been established, like the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy (University of Maryland), and the Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions (Illinois Institute of Technology). Applied philosophy has become a significant part of the profession. (Indeed, the October 1986 issue of the American Philosophical Association's Jobs for Philosophers lists 53 jobs that involve the teaching of applied philosophy-more than 25% of the 208 jobs listed!)

In spite of applied philosophy's current success, one still occasionally hears the taunt that it is not "real philosophy," or that branches of professional ethics, such as medical ethics, are "not autonomous disciplines." What should one make of such criticisms? Do they point to something significant about professional ethics or other areas of applied philosophy? Are they mere expressions of ignorance or fear of the new and different? Let us address these questions here to see if we can learn something of value about professional ethics. We can start by discussing medical ethics in particular.

2. Medical Ethics
In his article "There Is No ACME in Ethical Consulting" (1986), Paul Sharkey criticizes the growing practice of using medical ethics "consultants" to advise doctors in ethically difficult cases:

There is no such thing as a "board certified" ethical consultant-there is no 'American College of Medical Ethicists (ACME)"-nor should there be...
If being ethical means anything at all, it means being responsible. There cannot be "ethics specialists" because being responsible is not a speciality. (p. 6)

Thus, according to Sharkey, one cannot make a doctor virtuous by giving him or her advice, or making tough decisions in place of the doctor, or teaching a course in medical ethics. However,

It is even more absurd to believe that keeping people ignorant of basic principles of value, moral responsibility and ethical problem solving skills will contribute to their becoming ethically responsible. Assuming even a minimal predisposition to doing what is right, value education can only increase the probability of doing so. To argue otherwise is to argue that ignorance is better than knowledge. (p. 7)

Sharkey suggests that the best way to obtain virtuous doctors is to staff medical schools with doctors who practice medicine virtuously and thereby serve as appropriate rolemodels. And the proper role for a "Medical ethicist" is not as a consultant called in to tell a doctor what to do, but rather as part of a clinical team in a teaching hospital:

the ethicist . . .can help residents and faculty identify and work out ethical issues which they in turn can model for their students as part of an ethically and technologically integrated practice. Only by experiencing the responsibilities of being a resident or other independent practitioner are the ethicist's professional services likely to be appreciated. (p. 8)

But what if medical ethics is not even an autonomous field with its own data and principles? How could a so-called "medical ethicist" claim to have a kind of knowledge that others don't have? This question, according to Bernard Baumrin in his important article "The Autonomy of Medical Ethics" (1985), is a "fundamental" one for medical ethics:

I say `fundamental' because in the absence of an answer to this question, a critic might justifiably argue that every apparent question in medical ethics is really only a question of good science, or the low, or religion, or just plain ethics, and if that were so, then medical ethics could be justly dismissed as just so much vacuous gab better handled by scientists, lawyers, theologians, [ordinary] ethicists, hospital administrators, friends, family members or journalists than by anyone professing to have special knowledge about a special subject... if there is no special or autonomous discipline (no fundamental data) then the critic who claims the professor has no subject is right. (pp. 94-5)

According to Baumrin, a discipline is not "autonomous" if its technical terms are all definable in the language of another discipline and its fundamental principles are all derivable from another domain. He notes, for example, that metallurgy is reducible to chemistry, and chemistry itself is reducible to physics, so metallurgy and chemistry are not "autonomous" domains.

But if this account of autonomy is correct, Barnum's above point about medical ethics is a bit overstated. Even if chemistry and metallurgy are not autonomous, it would be incorrect to say that a metallurgy professor or a chemistry professor "has no subject," or that the lectures of such a professor are "just so much vacuous gab" better handled by a physicist. Similarly, medical ethics would be a useful and defensible enterprise, even if it were ultimately reducible to some other domain.

Baumrin's main point, however, is a much more important one, for it provides insight into the nature of medical ethics and, ultimately, other branches of professional ethics. His major claim is that medical ethics makes use of sui generis data and fundamental precepts that are not derivable from any other discipline. There are, he says "three interrelated precepts of medical science," which "form the bedrock of the morality of medical science." (p. 93) These "bedrock" principles are,

(1) healing through knowledge,
(2) ignorance justifies research,
(3) knowledge guides treatment.

These principles, according to Baumrin,derive from the fundamental value of medical science -health-and the Hippocratic commitment to knowledge as a means to healing:

No man of medicine, at least from Greek times, has been unaware of the fact that the `health' that medicine aims at is a good ranked very high by all or most people, and the job of medicine is to produce that good and no other in the form of prevention and healing. The whole idea behind the Hippocratic revolution in medicine is `healing through knowledge.' (p. 95)

The aim of medical science, then, is the acquisition of knowledge for the sake of healing; and the aim of medical practice is to heal by means of such knowledge. Baumrin sets out a case in his article in which these two goals of medicine conflict-a case in which medical science's pursuit of knowledge for healing conflicts with medical practice's duty to heal the patient in the most promising manner. In such a case,

there is a fundamental conflict between knowledge acquisition and knowledge application, and the study of that conflict and its resolution is a subject of medical ethics and no other discipline. It is this fact, even if there were no others, that establishes the autonomy of medical ethics, for it provides a species of data not reducible to the subject matter of other branches of study, and these data are addressed by principles specific to medical practice, imbedded deep in what the object of the medical arts is. (p. 101)

Baumrin's key point, then, is that medical ethics is more than the application of general moral concepts and principles to medical practice. It involves values and principles specific to medicine, and not derivable from any other field. Of course, it also deals, he says, with applications of regular moral principles-for example, truth-telling to patients and family members, or social justice in the allocation of scarce medical resources and the right to medical care. A proper understanding of the field of medical ethics, then, requires both general moral theories and values and precepts unique to medicine.

Is this combination of "borrowed" and "domain specific" values and principles unique to medical ethics? Do all branches of professional ethics have such a two-fold combination of moral elements? In a footnote at the end of his article, Baumrin claims that similar analysis could be given of other branches of applied ethics and thereby establish "the autonomy of applied ethics as a general branch of philosophic study." (p. 102) If this is correct, one should be able to identify, for each branch of professional ethics, one or more key values and related precepts not associated with other disciplines nor with general moral theory. In addition, of course, one would expect to find some issues in each branch that involve "merely" applications of regular moral rules and concepts.

3. Other Branches of Professional Ethics
It is not at all difficult to find issues in any profession that involve the application of general (i.e., non profession-specific) moral rules and values, such as truth-telling, respect for privacy, and so on: In business, one should not cheat one's customers nor file fraudulent income tax returns; an engineer should not mislead a client about his or her ability to design a structure or machine; a computer scientist should not invade nor alter the private computer files of others; and so on. Just like moral questions in everyday life, many such "professional" issues are easily resolved without sophisticated analysis, while others are "sticky" and troublesome. Given the abovenoted point that knowledge is better than ignorance, a business person, lawyer, engineer, computer scientist, and so on, should be able to handle the difficult cases more effectively given a background in "ordinary" moral analysis and moral reasoning -especially if this included practice in dealing with a variety of typical cases from the profession in question. This fact alone would justify courses, speeches, and publications in professional ethics, even if they were to employ only general moral theories.

But is Baumrin correct that each profession also has its own fundamental good (like health in medicine) and some resulting "bedrock moral precepts" that are not shared by other professions? It does seem to be almost "common sense" that each profession provides some service, and thus promotes some good that people need or want. As Powers and Vogel (1980) note:

physicians heal, ministers serve, nurses nourish, educators "lead out" ....
The starting point for most applied professional ethics is inevitably the normative purpose of the profession. It is the professional purpose that provides the filter through which principles are strained. As circumstances of professional practice change, the specific responsibilities of the practitioner change. Some principles take on new meaning or importance; some must recede. But the purpose of a profession does not change .... (Powers and Vogel 1980, p. 3)

According to Powers and Vogel, a business manager should promote the successful functioning of the firm in which he or she works, which in turn promotes the service or good which the firm provides to society.

Michael Bayles, in his book Professional Ethics (1981), also appears to assume that each profession has its own special good. Thus, he says, "the services of professionals are important for individuals to realize the values they seek in their personal lives-health, wealth, justice, comfort, and safety." (p. 10) So,

Consulting engineers and architects design the structures and facilities essential to modern life-buildings, houses, power stations, transportation systems, and so on. Most of us depend on the medical and dental professions to protect our health and well-being, even our lives. The legal profession provides services essential for justice and equality before the law. Accountants, as auditors, testify to the financial integrity of institutions and keep track of the wealth in society. (P 10)

Such examples of profession specific values and "normative purposes of professions" are consistent with Baumrin's analysis. But what about the "bedrock precepts" that he says follow from the profession specific values? Are there any such moral principles in other professions, comparable to "healing through knowledge" or "knowledge guides treatment" in medicine? I think the best approach to answering this important question is to use the "role morality" analysis employed by Norman Bowie in his book Business Ethics (1982). Bowie traces this kind of ethical analysis back to F. H. Bradley (see, for example, Bradley's essay "My Station and its Duties" (1876)).

Role morality takes note of the fact that having a role within any cooperative human endeavor-whether it be in a family, a club, a company, society in general, or whatever-bring with it certain duties and obligations. Regarding parenthood, for example, Bowie notes:

Being a parent brings with it obligations and responsibilities. One's stewardship as a parent can be judged against one's performance in carrying out one's obligations and responsibilities. Some parents are better than others. The extensive and willful neglect of one's parental responsibilities is universally branded as immoral. Being a parent involves having a certain station in life, and with that station certain duties are associated. (Bowie 1982, pp. 4-5)

Similarly, says Bowie, the same point holds with regard to one's job; and, "The more professional a job, the greater the responsibilities that go with it" (p. 6) Professionals who help people achieve or preserve important values like health, justice, knowledge, and so on have especially stringent role-related obligations.

Since his book concerns business ethics, Bowie goes on to discuss the role-related morality of business. He then offers arguments (Kantian in nature) to show that certain "universal moral obligations"-namely, those regarding justice and individual rights-"supersede role morality in all its forms." Similar arguments can be given for other professions besides business; and, if one accepts the Kantian approach, they are strong ones. (However, there is no space here to rehearse them.)

4. Conclusions
Using Bowie's "role morality" approach, we are now in a position to assess Baumrin's claims about "bedrock precepts," and also to draw some conclusions about the usefulness of professional ethics. When one assumes the role of a professional, he or she takes on certain rolespecific duties-in general, those which advance and preserve the special good(s) at which the profession in question aims. The resulting profession-specific duties impose obligations upon the professional that do not normally apply to everyone else (a doctor has the obligation to heal through knowledge, a lawyer to advance legal justice, a teacher to promote knowledge and remove ignorance, and so on). These "bedrock precepts" of the professions get refined and articulated into a variety of more specific obligations, which depend upon the particular conditions and circumstances of those involved.

Although such profession-specific obligations usually are consistent with general moral values and principles, sometimes they clash. When this happens, the professional precepts must give way to general morality. Thus a doctor may not steal or cheat on his or her taxes even to advance the health of a patient, and a lawyer may not murder someone even to gain legal justice for a client.

Sometimes cases arise (as Baumrin notes) in which two or more professional precepts within the same discipline conflict with each other. In such a situation, general moral theory will be of no use to the professional because the obligations are specific to the profession in question and not incumbent upon everyone. In that kind of case, the special knowledge of professional ethicsrather than general moral knowledge-can be of particular help. In summary, then, if we combine the obvious point that "knowledge is better than ignorance" with Baumrin s demonstration that professional ethics is in an important sense "autonomous," it is clear that courses, conferences, training programs and publications in professional ethics can provide valuable tools to the world's professionals and thereby help to contribute to a better world.

References
Baumrin, Bernard H. 1985. "The Autonomy of Medical Ethics: Medical Science vs Medical Practice." Metaphilosophy, vol.l6, pp. 93-102.

Bayles, Michael D. 1981. Professional Ethics. Wadsworth Publishing Company.

Bowie, Norman. 1982. Business Ethics. Prentice-Hall.

Bradley, EH. 1876. "My Station and Its Duties." In his Ethical Studies. Oxford University Press. (Reprinted in 1927 and 1935.)

Powers, Charles W. and Vogel, David. 1980. Ethics in the Education of Business Managers. The Hastings Center. Sharkey, Paul W 1986. "There Is No ACME In Ethical Consulting." American Philosophical Association Philosophy and Medicine Newsletter, Fall Issue, pp. 6-8.

Stevenson, Leslie, 1970. "Applied Philosophy." Metaphilosophy, vol.l, pp. 258-67.