Professor Roland Schinzinger of the University of California, Irvine, advocated a conception of engineering as experimentation to serve as a framework for dealing with ethical issues. "To live in harmony, Schinzinger maintained, social man must carefully balance his individual needs and desires against those of the collective. Accordingly, ethical conduct would achieve this end; however, since nobody within the engineering profession can seem to agree on ultimate goals, compromise is an essential component of ethical conduct. Rules represent this compromise, he claimed, and if engineers can reconcile practice with rules, therein lies the model for behavior."

To demonstrate the ethical problems induced by technology's vast range, Schinzinger introduced four examples. The first one, Hammurabi s Building Code, issued in 1758 BC, provided an incentive for self regulation. The code demanded that the builder be responsible for his work with his life; it also necessitated a marginal bureaucracy and left the specifics to the experts. His second example, the Steamboat Code enacted in this country in 1852, highlighted the dire consequences of corruptible safety inspectors and unspecific instructions for safety inspectors. As a result of these lapses, boiler explosions occurred frequently and a substantial number of lives were lost. With his third example, the sinking of the Titanic, Schinzinger quoted a situation where an unforeseen problem (the sinking of an "unsinkable" ship) stemmed from insufficient safety measures (there weren't enough lifeboats to go around). Since "current vessel regulations regarding lifeboats did not foresee vessels of this magnitude," the code was useless in a crisis. The 1969 Santa Barbara Oil Spill, a case of expert knowledge being ignored, served as his final example. The leaking of 235,000 gallons of crude oil from offshore drilling led to a demand for tighter laws and controls.

Schinzinger argued that the massive scale of technology demands immediate attention; society can't afford to wait until after-the-fact to remedy "self-regulation by industry to avoid costly litigation." He explained that since the legal system could not be expected to keep pace with technology, regulatory agencies were created. However, as his examples pointed out, these agencies often proved inefficient because the growth of technology was always a step ahead. Thus, responsibility for safety can only be determined by professional experts and it is on their shoulders, he contended, that the burden must lie.

Schinzinger's proposal to view engineering as experimentation results from the inherent technical uncertainties that the professional must face. He suggested that, with this recognition comas the duty to obtain informed consent from those who may be affected by the technology. Thus, to encourage professional responsibility, the engineer would be further obligated to share information and to monitor projects after completion. Such a focus on experimentation, concluded Schinzinger, would ultimately regulate individual behavior for the good of society.

Professors Dan Platte and George Gray of the Engineering Department of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute weighed engineering accountability against corporate responsibility.Decrying the current excess of government regulation, they suggested that responsible individual conduct replace regulatory control. Platte and Gray concluded by proposing that professional societies organize to the end of enforcing engineering accountability. Thus, they claim, industry would realize greater profit, which would ultimately serve to benefit the public.

Within the private enterprise system, Pletta and Gray view the growth of the Industrial Revolution as having provoked a strategic shift from "Let the buyer beware" to "Let the corporation take care." Increased bureaucracy and decreased personal freedom resulted. To counterbalance what they consider the threat of restricted freedom, Platte and Gray proposed joint professional corporate teamwork.

Before describing their solution, Platte and Gray investigated the origin of government regulation. They claimed that, as industrial products became more complex, buyers became unable to judge product liability. However, with the resultant cost of insurance born by the public, citizens were the ultimate victims of technological sophistication.In response to the public's increasing disenchantment with unsafe products and services, as well as its disillusionment with the unconcerned professional, politicians created more government agencies. Pletta and Gray argued that the cost of these agencies to society "has been estimated to exceed industries' net profit five fold." Thus, in the name of the public's health, safety, and welfare, self-regulation by local professionals would diminish the need for these constraints.

To achieve self-regulation, Platte and Gray proposed a two-part system. While engineers would be held "ethically accountable," corporations would assume the financial burden. Additionally, the "engineer-in-charge of the project would be held accountable by his peer group." This situation would give rise to the need for a professional society, run according to a code of ethics whose enforcement would be the duty of the society.

Anticipating several imperfections in their system, Pletta and Gray proposed the following. To the charge of "short-sighted managers more interested in profit than safety." they would offer the services of a professional ombudsman. To guard against erratic judicial dispensations, they advocated that one organization administer one uniform code.

Platte and Gray maintained that a unified organization based on participatory membership would succeed if members were allowed to directly elect their council. This procedure, they claimed, could be echoed on a national and on an international level as well as on the initial local level.Commenting on the session, Samuel C. Florman of Kreisler Borg Florman Construction Company criticized both speakers' viewpoints. Though he strongly endorsed a competitive economic system, he also saw a need for government intervention on the basis that self-regulation "ignores . . . the fact that our most serious problems stem not from evil intent, but rather from simple ignorance." Florman argued that "selfdiscipline is no substitute for government regulation." Directly disputing Platte's and Gray's argument, he said that ". . . under no circumstances do I want my safety or well-being to depend upon the taste or inclination of a designated engineer, much less on his moral whim."

To substantiate his claim that self-regulation is ineffectual, Florman also charged that it "rewards the renegades and rascals." Furthermore, he pointed out that our country's legal system protects "the rights of individuals against the pressure of their peers," so the enforcement of ethical accountability by professional societies, as suggested by Pletta and Gray, would be virtually impossible.

Florman concluded, "In most cases, however, the problem to be dealt with is not a matter of ethics but a matter of reasoned choice not what risk is moral, but rather what risk is acceptable, and this is a choice. I maintain, that should be made by society as a whole."