Professor Ken Alpern advanced the seemingly paradoxical thesis that "ordinary moral requirements" frequently demand moral heroism of engineers. Alpern distinguished between two types of moral heroism. "The first type is supererogation or moral sainthood. It is to regularly do morally good things in excess of what is strictly required by morality. It is action above and beyond the call of duty. The second type of moral heroism is fortitude or moral courage. It does not involve exceeding ordinary moral requirements, but rather meeting ordinary requirements in the face of extraordinary obstacles, temptations, pressures and the like." Concerning the general requirements of morality, Alpern advanced the following principle as incontestable: "When one is in a position to contribute to greater harm or is in a position to play a more critical part in producing harm, one should exercise greater care to avoid doing so."

The foregoing principle, together with Alpern's specification of the second type of moral heroism, yielded the principal thesis of his paper: "Engineers in general exercise considerable control over technology-its design, quality, safety, use, and maintenance. They are thus in a position to affect the public's well being, for better or worse, to a greater extent than others. It is therefore appropriate to require of engineers greater care, including a willingness to make greater personal sacrifices in order to do what they ought in regard to the public welfare. This higher standard is not a matter of supererogation, but is merely the consequence of ordinary moral requirements applied in their situation. However, since there will often be significant pressures and disincentives to their meeting these ordinary moral requirements, engineers must exhibit moral courage in the course of their everyday work."

Alpern defended the above thesis against four objections which one might advance against it. First, he noted that individuals at times attempt to evade a difficult morally required action by complaining that doing so would cause them to lose their jobs. Second, one at times hears people disclaim moral responsibility by saying 'If I don't do it then someone else will.' Third, in some instances, a person insists that a given difficult but morally required action is not his job. Finally, the omnipresence of immoral practices on the part of employers is often cited as a reason for regarding them as unavoidable, that is, as practices one will have to engage in regardless of where one works.

Alpern presented a variety of grounds for categorically rejecting all four of the above kinds of arguments. He added, however, that engineers faced with situations that require moral heroism deserve sympathy. In addition, Alpern contended that society owes these engineers support because ". . . it is not neutral in the choice to become an engineer. To some extent society creates their problem by channeling student into a rigorous engineering curriculum which usually offers them little idea of what to expect on the job while extolling the virtues of the profession. Society thus `owes' support, at least to the extent that it is responsible for the engineer's moral predicament."

Professor Lisa Newton of Fairfield University, who served as commentator for the first Friday morning session, warmly endorsed Alpern's conclusions. ' As Alpern points out," she said, "no new rights and duties have to be derived to fit the case of engineers. The good old principle of due care will suffice, given the understanding long accepted in the law, that the duty bears with special force on the responsible professional. Only acceptance of this duty . . . will do the job we need done." "Government regulation, Newton declared, "is hopelessly ignorant, misguided, slipshod, and occasionally corrupt, not to mention expensive beyond belief. The responsible professional is guarantor ultimately of the moral conduct of the enterprise of engineering."