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Patent licensing and the research university

By csep - Posted on 09 August 2010

TitlePatent licensing and the research university
Publication TypeUnpublished
Year of Publication2004
AuthorsJensen, Richard A., and Thursby Marie C.
Series TitleNational Bureau of Economic Research Working Papers
NumberNBER Working Paper No. 10758
Pagination25 p.
Date Published09/2004
PublisherUnited States National Bureau of Economic Research
Place PublishedWashington, D.C.
Publication LanguageEnglish

[The authors] construct a dynamic model of university research that allows [them] to examine recent concerns that financial incentives associated with university patent licensing are detrimental to the traditional mission of US research universities. [They] assume a principal-agent framework in which the university administration is the principal and a faculty researcher is the agent. Whether or not the researcher remains in the university, and if so her choice of the amount of time to spend on basic and applied research, is complicated by the fact that she earns license income and prestige both inside and outside the university. Thus in contrast to usual principal agent models the participation constraint is endogenous. This, plus the fact that current research affects future knowledge stocks, allows us to show that it is far from obvious that licensing will damage basic research and education. (Copyright 2004, Richard A. Jenson and Marie C. Thursby)